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SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: WHO NEEDS IT? 
Brian Galle* 
Abstract: State statutes authorizing firms to pursue mixtures of profitable 
and socially beneficial goals have proliferated in the past five years. In this 
invited response essay, I argue that for one large class of charitable goals, 
the so-called “social enterprise” firm is often privately wasteful. Although 
the hybrid form is a bit more sensible for firms that combine profit with 
simple, easily monitored social benefits, existing laws fail to protect stake-
holders against opportunistic conversion of the firm to pure profit-
seeking. Given these failings, I suggest that social enterprise’s legislative 
popularity can best be traced to a race to the bottom among states com-
peting to siphon away federal tax dollars for local businesses. Not all hy-
brid forms inevitably are failures, however. For example, the convertible 
debt instruments proposed by Dana Brakman Reiser and Steven Dean— 
the inspiration for this response—offer a promising route forward for 
“cold glow” firms wishing to clean up some easily-measured but harmful 
business practices. 
Introduction 
 Social enterprise lawmaking is a growth industry. Over the past 
four years, state statutes authorizing new forms of corporate entities 
have proliferated.1 The new entities come in several flavors—low-profit 
limited liability companies, “benefit corporations,” and others—all with 
the common element that they purport to authorize the firm’s manag-
ers to mix profit with some other socially valuable function. 
 These developments are puzzling. As I argue here, organizational 
theory suggests that these “hybrid” forms will typically be dominated 
either by traditional nonprofit forms, or instead by plain old for-profits. 
The large transaction costs of mixing complex charitable goals with 
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from Kelli Alces, Mark Blumberg, Evelyn Brody, Jack Horak, Ben Leff, Peter Molk, and 
Mark Underberg.  My special thanks to Dana Brakman Reiser and Steven Dean for the 
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1 Stephanie Strom, A Quest for Hybrid Companies That Profit, But Can Tap Charity, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 12, 2011, at B1; Rachel Culley & Jill R. Horwitz, Profits v. Purpose: Hybrid Com-
panies and the Charitable Dollar 4–5 (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law. & Legal Theory Working Pa-
per Series, Working Paper No. 272, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2055368. 
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profit imply that only considerable economies of scope, or perhaps a 
handful of other unusual combinations of circumstances, can justify the 
combination. 
 Of course, not all socially beneficial goals are complex. Firms with 
simple aims, such as paying living wages or avoiding particular toxic 
inputs, can more easily contract with their stakeholders or commit to 
their customers. For these firms, the problem is that one or more own-
ers may decide to sell to someone uninterested in the original do-
gooder bargain. Existing social enterprise statutes only superficially ad-
dress that problem. 
 Against this backdrop, Dana Brakman Reiser and Steven Dean 
have arrived to propose an alternative.2 Rather than a new form of 
firm, they suggest that, with a few tweaks to standard debt covenants, 
entrepreneurs can successfully raise money both to earn profits and do 
some good. Notably, as they acknowledge, their proposal aims only to 
protect investors and entrepreneurs from opportunistic sales by their 
counterparty, and does not do much to bind either side during the or-
dinary course of the firm’s dealings. Their proposal does, however, fill 
exactly the hole social enterprise currently faces. 
 Their proposal therefore reinforces my general claim that existing 
social enterprise statutes add little if any social value.3 In the meantime, 
proponents are busily attempting to secure various forms of subsidy. 
Unless the existing statutes evolve, lawmakers and regulators should 
view these calls for subsidy with deep suspicion. 
 Part I of this Essay sets out background economic theory on the 
formation of nonprofits, and adds a new tidbit on the distortionary ef-
fects of tax rules on the choice of entities.4 Part II expands on the 
transaction-costs critique of hybrid entities, arguing that the case for 
using these forms to produce most standard charitable goods is implau-
sible.5 Part III elaborates on the suggestion that social enterprise may 
overcome some narrow problems in for-profit firms that want to elimi-
                                                                                                                      
2 Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with FLY Paper: A Hybrid Finan-
cial Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 1495, 1544 (2013). 
3 I am not the only skeptic. See, e.g., Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The 
“Emperor’s New Clothes” on the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 Del. J. Corp. L. 879, 
881 (2010) (criticizing the low-profit limited liability company form); see also J. William 
Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will 
Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 Vt. 
L. Rev. 273, 274 (2010) (criticizing the low-profit limited liability company form but gen-
erally supporting the notion of social enterprise). 
4 See infra notes 9–23 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 24–59 and accompanying text. 
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nate some “cold glow” aspects of their production process.6 Part IV 
considers whether the growing legislative popularity of social enterprise 
casts doubt on my claim that it is mostly superfluous; I argue that it 
does not, because existing hybrid entities are spawned instead by a race 
to the bottom.7 Part V returns to the Brakman Reiser and Dean pro-
posal, showing how, despite its limits, the proposal does help social en-
terprise to overcome the main problem it currently faces.8 
I. The Contract-Failure Theory of the Nonprofit Firm 
 To understand why many existing hybrid entity proposals are deep-
ly flawed, it is helpful first to understand the problem that social enter-
prise purports to solve. Why would anyone ever want to found a social 
enterprise, or to invest in one? Profits, of course, are nice. So is saving 
the world. But what would make someone want to do both in one or-
ganization? 
 Let’s begin with a step backward to “pure” or traditional nonprof-
its. By definition, a nonprofit is a firm that can’t distribute net profits to 
the people who control or invest in it.9 Why, then, would an entrepre-
neur with an exciting new idea form one? The short answer, first devel-
oped by Henry Hansmann and later elaborated by other economists, is 
transaction costs and asymmetric information.10 Suppose the new idea 
is a low-cost method for improving the lives of sub-Saharan farmers. 
Our irrigation entrepreneur—let’s call her Ellie—plans to sell her ser-
vices not to the farmers who will most directly benefit, but instead to 
others, who want to see the farmers achieve a better life. Perhaps these 
funders are generous souls; maybe they are just oil companies who want 
to see greater political stability in resource-rich areas. Either way, once 
she has accepted money from her “customers,” Ellie can easily appro-
priate most of the firm’s resources to her own goals. For instance, she 
can disappear into the desert with the dollars. Or, more realistically, she 
might deliver a very low-quality product that allows her greater net 
profits. 
                                                                                                                      
6 See infra notes 60–79 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 80–90 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 91–99 and accompanying text. 
9 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835, 838 (1980). 
10 David Easley & Maureen O’Hara, The Economic Role of the Nonprofit Firm, Bell J. 
Econ., Autumn 1983, at 531, 536; Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Not-For-Profit Entre-
preneurs, 81 J. Pub. Econ. 99, 100–01 (2001); Hansmann, supra note 9, at 843–45; George 
G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, 
and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1102, 1147 (2004). 
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 Contract law, or other less formal arrangements, comprises one 
standard set of solutions to this kind of dilemma.11 When payment and 
performance are not simultaneous, the second-moving party has op-
portunities for hold-ups and self-dealing. But the threat of liability for 
breach, or some similar but less formal sanction, constrains these be-
haviors, and thus creates incentives for both sides to invest in their mu-
tually beneficial deal. 
 What makes Ellie’s firm distinctive is that it is difficult to draft ex 
ante an enforceable contract to constrain her potential for opportun-
ism. In Hansmann’s version of the story, the problem is typically that 
the “customers,” those who are paying Ellie for her work, do not di-
rectly observe the quality of her outputs, or do not observe whether 
their individual contribution is used to further that quality.12 Further, it 
is difficult to imagine how one could write a contract that would specify 
the quality of the firm outputs in a way that could be enforced by a 
court.13 One could measure intermediate results, such as the farmers’ 
crop yields, but determining quality of life is more challenging. Or 
perhaps the contract could be written, but the costs of specifying all the 
tradeoffs and exceptions each side could invoke would be prohibitive, 
relative to the value of the venture. For instance, should Ellie be liable 
if she claims she exerted a lot of effort, but there happened to be a bad 
drought that year? Negotiating that provision will take a long time. 
 Hansmann’s argument, later supported formally in models by Ed-
ward Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, is that the nonprofit form is a partial 
solution to these kinds of contract failures.14 By promising to limit her 
payouts, Ellie has lowered her own incentives for later misappropria-
tions. To be sure, those incentives have not disappeared; she might still 
simply take the money and run. But she has less of an incentive to cut 
quality to increase her returns.15 
                                                                                                                      
 
11 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976) (explaining how 
contracting relates to firm formation). 
12 Hansmann, supra note 9, at 846–48, 850–51. 
13 See Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 
Wis. L. Rev. 227, 228–29; Triantis, supra note 10, at 1147–49. 
14 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 10, at 103–06; Hansmann, supra note 9, at 844; cf. 
Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 
941, 965 (1963) (suggesting that the profit-making aspect of hospitals is relatively unim-
portant because the doctors’ commitment to professionalism assures patients that doctors 
will prioritize their care over profits). 
15 Hansmann suggests that the nonprofit promise could be enforced through private 
contracts, including contracts to limit distributed profit to a fixed amount or a portion of 
gross revenues. Hansmann, supra note 9, at 851–52. He argues that the nonprofit form is 
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 In return, Ellie can claim a basic salary and other perquisites. For 
example, she gets to use the firm’s resources to further her personal 
goals. Of course, the combination of small cash and big personal re-
wards will be most appealing to entrepreneurs who are strongly moti-
vated by those personal goals.16 Alternately, as I have argued elsewhere, 
the entrepreneur’s rewards may come from being perceived as virtuous 
by others.17 Then her commitment to sacrifice profits not only reas-
sures her funders, but also boosts her personal reward by increasing 
public perceptions of her generosity. 
 Prior accounts have glossed over the importance of tax to the 
choice of nonprofit form—not the firm’s tax, but the entrepreneur’s. 
Profits are taxable, but personal satisfaction and the “warm glow” of 
being perceived as virtuous are not.18 Under the U.S. income tax, this 
difference in effect provides up to a nearly 40% subsidy to entrepre-
neurs who trade cash profits for psychic rewards.19 Ellie and her inves-
tors can divide this subsidy between themselves. Further, to the extent 
that the investors, too, get personal satisfaction from investing with El-
                                                                                                                      
generally preferable because it economizes on drafting and enforcement costs. Id. This is 
puzzling, as permitting some limited distribution of profit seems inconsistent with the rest 
of his account. Capping profit payouts does cabin the managers’ incentives to cut quality. 
But how can individual contributors know whether their money makes any marginal con-
tribution to charitable production? Cf. Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 10, at 109 (observing 
that donors do not contribute to for-profit firms because contributions are unlikely to 
increase quality on the margins). For example, imagine that a manager works for profit 
until she hits the cap, and then for charity for the rest of the year. Contributors cannot 
know whether their funds will be used in the first stage or the second, or indeed if there 
will be a second stage, because the manager’s incentive is to just barely reach it. This is 
akin to the public goods problem Hansmann previously identifies as a source of contract 
failure. Hansmann, supra note 9, at 850–51. 
16 Myron J. Roomkin & Burton A. Weisbrod, Managerial Compensation and Incentives in 
For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 750, 753–54 (1999) (discussing 
compensation mechanisms and the utility of nonmonetary incentives). 
17 Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 1213, 1224–25 (2010). 
18 See Daniel Shaviro, The Man Who Lost Too Much: Zarin v. Commissioner and the Meas-
urement of Taxable Consumption, 45 Tax L. Rev. 215, 223–29 (1990) (discussing the standard 
income tax approach to non-material benefits). 
19 Id. at 223–24. The real subsidy is probably a good bit smaller. First, many managers are 
likely to be taxed at below the maximum statutory rate. See I.R.C. § 1(a) (2006) (providing 
for a graduated rate of tax on individual taxable income). Second, small businesses are al-
ready heavily subsidized, such as through devices that allow entrepreneurs lawfully to convert 
their heavily taxed labor income into lightly taxed capital earnings. Victor Fleischer, Taxing 
Founders’ Stock, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 60, 80–88 (2011). Moreover, even if Ellie’s business were 
taxable, some or all of this subsidy could be lost at the firm level because the firm would like-
ly lose the deduction it would otherwise have claimed if it had paid Ellie in cash. See id. Fi-
nally, many small businesses unlawfully reduce their tax bill by underreporting income. See 
Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, J. Econ. Persp., Winter 2007, at 
25, 29–30. 
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lie, and take a lower payout as a result, they are also receiving a tax sub-
sidy—they swap taxable profits for untaxed satisfaction. 
 To be sure, the nonprofit form is costly. For one, you can’t eat pres-
tige: satisfaction and other perquisites of entrepreneurship are less liq-
uid than cash compensation would be. Exiting a venture is also difficult 
for the entrepreneur; ownership stakes in the firm cannot readily be 
sold, so founders who walk away from their venture typically must sacri-
fice any property or “sweat equity” they’ve contributed to the firm.20 
Further, because the firm cannot sell equity to raise money, its main 
non-donative source of outside funding will be through borrowing. Debt 
financing adds additional “agency costs” to the firm: Since the creditors’ 
interest does not align with the managers’, the firm must negotiate and 
submit to costly bonding provisions that may limit its flexibility.21 
 Firms choose nonprofit status, then, when the benefits exceed 
these costs.22 Entrepreneurs who derive large value from perquisites— 
those who are strongly motivated by altruism or warm glow—are more 
likely to accept the tradeoff of perks over cash tradeoff. That tradeoff is 
also easier to swallow when there wouldn’t be much profit to distribute 
anyway.23 Nonprofit status is also more attractive when the costs of giv-
ing up equity financing are lower, that is, when equity financing would 
be prohibitively expensive, debt is cheap, or the firm has access to some 
special funding such as donations or government grants. Presumably 
                                                                                                                      
20 Exit constraints are a bit looser under many state laws. States typically permit non-
profits to opt to be “mutual benefit” corporations, in which case the firm can repurchase 
ownership stakes from its members. Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit 
Organizations 159–60 (2004). But these entities are generally not eligible for federal 
501(c)(3) status, and they typically cannot claim most state-level tax benefits reserved for 
“community benefit” or charitable organizations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) (as 
amended in 2008) (requiring applicants to demonstrate that firm assets will be reserved 
for charitable purposes upon dissolution). 
21 The agency costs of debt may be somewhat lower at nonprofit firms than at tradi-
tional for-profit firms. Usually, an entrepreneur and her equity investors take more risks 
than lenders would prefer because the equity holders are entitled to all the upside gains 
that would result from successful gambles. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 334–35. By 
definition, nonprofit managers do not have this opportunity. Instead, they draw a salary, 
which makes them in effect a creditor of the firm. So it would seem that this traditional 
source of creditor-manager conflict does not arise. There could, however, be other sources 
of conflict. Other stakeholders, such as donors, may offer the manager some incentives, 
such as bonuses, to take on additional risk. Creditors may also demand that the firm be 
managed in a way that preserves existing revenue streams, even if that revenue is no longer 
an important goal for the firm. Consider, for instance, a hospital with significant debts that 
is reviewing its charity-care and debtor-forgiveness policies. Creditors may demand a more 
revenue-friendly approach than the hospital’s managers want to pursue. 
22 Hansmann, supra note 9, at 879. 
23 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 10, at 105. 
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the tax subsidy for perks also tips some marginal entrepreneurs from 
for-profit to nonprofit. 
II. Social Enterprise and the Theory of the (Hybrid) Firm 
 This account of the nonprofit firm makes social enterprise, or 
what I’ve been calling “hybrid” firms, something of a puzzle.24 An oth-
erwise profit-making firm that wants also to produce some charitable 
good seems to face all of the costs I’ve just mentioned. In many in-
stances, those costs are even greater than they would be for a pure char-
ity, and the offsetting benefits are even smaller. 
A. Make or Buy?: The Downside of Integration 
 Most obviously, the opportunity costs of charitable spending are 
higher at a profitable firm. In general, if the firm is allocating capital 
efficiently, it should have new investment opportunities that exceed 
those available in the general marketplace for capital.25 If the firm can’t 
do better than its shareholders with its money, the shareholders will 
demand that the firm return the cash to them so they can invest with it. 
Giving up these supranormal returns in order to invest in creating 
some charitable output is thus costlier than if the shareholders spent 
the money themselves. The firm’s stakeholders will have to place a par-
ticularly high value on perks to justify this higher expense. 
 Consider next the costs of contracting. There is nothing about 
running a for-profit business that makes the difficulty of contracting for 
the production of charitable goods easier, and indeed the opposite is 
very likely true. Suppose the entrepreneur and her investors jointly 
agree that they want to divert some of the firm’s revenues to the chari-
table activity.26 But how much charity will the firm do, at what quality, 
and at what cost? Now the investors have two worries: that the manager 
will do too little charity, and also that she will do too much.27 
                                                                                                                      
 
24 Although the term “social enterprise” can also include organizational forms other 
than the “hybrid form” I have discussed, see Robert A. Katz & Anthony Page, The Role of 
Social Enterprise, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 59, 60–62 (2010), I use the two terms as synonyms here for 
convenience. 
25 William J. Carney, Corporate Finance: Principles and Practice 717 (2d ed. 
2010). 
26 Assume for now that the charitable output cannot itself be produced at a profit. For 
example, it might be a quasi-public good: when one person buys it, many other people can 
also benefit without paying. Then almost no one has an incentive to pay. 
27 Cf. Briana Cummings, Note, Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to Promote 
the Public Interest, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 578, 602–13 (2012) (arguing that existing outside 
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 Worse, the investors will have lost what used to be one of their most 
effective monitoring tools. When the firm was purely profit-seeking, it 
was easy for investors to pay the manager in a way that would align her 
interests with theirs: they gave her stock, or stock options, making her a 
partial owner like them.28 There is currently no pay instrument, how-
ever, that matches a manager’s ex ante expected pay to her perform-
ance in fulfilling charitable goals—no surprise, given that those goals 
are tough to measure.29 So now the manager has two tasks, only one of 
which can easily be encouraged through incentive pay. In that setting, 
some economists argue, agency costs are so high that it is often prefer-
able to simply split the two sets of tasks into two distinct firms.30 
 For similar reasons, the hybrid firm likely cannot obtain cheap fi-
nancing through donations. Donors, like other investors, have no real 
way to control the hybrid manager. And donors are even worse off than 
many investors because they have no “exit” option. Investors unhappy 
with what they are able to observe of the entrepreneur’s behavior can 
usually just sell, if the firm’s shares are reasonably liquid, and buy stock 
in another company more suited to their preferences.31 Donors, in con-
trast, usually can’t get their money back. Perhaps the donor can write a 
contract that authorizes reimbursement if the donee misuses the funds, 
                                                                                                                      
monitoring tools for hybrid entities are a poor fit for goals such as “diversity,” “health,” or 
“education”). For additional discussion of the two-task problem in the production of pub-
lic goods, see Avinash K. Dixit, The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost 
Politics Perspective 95–98 (1996); Daron Acemoglu et al., Incentives in Markets, Firms, 
and Governments, 24 J.L. Econ. & Org. 273, 274 (2007); Oliver Hart et al., The Proper Scope 
of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q.J. Econ. 1127, 1136–41 (1997). 
Even if the parties could negotiate a contract in advance in an effort to balance the com-
peting goals, doing so would sacrifice some of the entrepreneur’s superior knowledge and 
capacity for experiment. Benjamin Moses Leff, The Case Against For-Profit Charity, 42 Seton 
Hall L. Rev. 819, 851–52 (2012). 
28 See David I. Walker, The Law and Economics of Executive Compensation: Theory and Evi-
dence, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law 232, 236–37 
(Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012). It is usually argued that options are 
needed to make managers fully as risk-seeking as investors. Id. at 237–38. The manager, 
unlike the fully diversified investor, has undiversifiable human capital invested in the firm; 
therefore, she must be given an instrument that offers her pure upside to compensate her 
for taking risky wagers with her human capital. See id. 
29 See Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and Ethics of 
Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1345, 1410–11 (2003) (arguing that incentive-
based pay is inaccurate and therefore undesirable in charitable organizations). 
30 Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Con-
tracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 24, 43–48 (1991); Bengt Holm-
strom, The Firm as a Subeconomy, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 74, 90–99 (1999). 
31 D. Gordon Smith, The Role of Shareholders in the Modern American Corporation, in Re-
search Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law, supra note 28, at 52, 61–62. 
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maybe even with interest.32 But, again, those contracts are extremely 
difficult to write and enforce, as any casual student of the law of chari-
table trusts could attest.33 And donors of labor—volunteers—almost 
certainly cannot reclaim their lost investment. 
 In addition to these higher costs, the rewards of charitable work at 
a hybrid may be lower, too. I’ve argued before that even if investors can 
monitor the entrepreneur, outside observers usually can’t.34 If the good 
graces of those observers is an important source of warm glow for man-
agers and investors, then the hybrid form costs both groups a good deal 
of reward—reward that is specially tax-favored relative to cash.35 
 Given all these factors, it seems the best option for the firm and its 
investors will often be to “buy” charity, rather than “make” it.36 That is, 
even if it makes sense to use firm funds for charitable work (or for in-
vestors to allow the firm to buy charitable output on their behalf), there 
is no reason the work has to be done inside the firm. The firm could 
instead just find an outside charity—or, heck, found one—and donate 
money to it.37 
 Allocating charitable production to an outside firm also makes 
sense from a managerial perspective. The time and attention of top 
leadership is a key, and scarce, resource for the firm.38 Managers skilled 
at profitably operating in their own industry may lack skill or interest in 
supervising an in-house charity. 
                                                                                                                      
32 State law traditionally was hostile to revocable gifts, but the modern trend is toward 
increased donor control. Fremont-Smith, supra note 20, at 338–39. 
33 For an overview of the problems of enforcing gifts to charitable organizations over 
time, see id. at 173–84. 
34 Galle, supra note 17, at 1224–25. 
35 Admittedly, though, the tax benefits of perquisites are smaller for the hybrid firm. 
When the hybrid firm uses cash to replace lost warm glow, it can take a deduction against any 
taxable profit it earns. If the firm’s marginal tax rate is equal to the employee’s rate, the two 
effects are a wash. Currently, top individual rates are a bit higher than corporate rates, and 
are much higher than the effective tax rate for international firms. See Philip Dittmer, Tax 
Found., U.S. Corporations Suffer High Effective Tax Rates by International Standards, Special Rep., 
Sept. 2011, at 1, 10, available at http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/ 
docs/sr195.pdf. Compare I.R.C. § 1(a) (2006) (stating that the top individual tax rate is 39.6%), 
with I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(D) (2006) (stating that the top corporate tax rate is 35%). In these lat-
ter two scenarios, there is still a net tax cost to replacing warm glow with cash. 
36 For an overview of the literature on the boundaries of the firm, and an empirical as-
sessment, see Peter G. Klein, The Make-or-Buy Decision: Lessons from Empirical Studies, in 
Handbook of New Institutional Economics 435, 455–57 (Claude Ménard & Mary M. 
Shirley eds., 2008). 
37 Culley & Horwitz, supra note 1, at 16. 
38 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 
55 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (2002) (discussing strategies for abating corporate shirking). 
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 The collapse of Google.org (“DotOrg”), Google’s erstwhile philan-
thropic arm, is instructive in this regard. According to published ac-
counts, Sergey Brin39 was so bored during important DotOrg meetings 
that he would do pushups.40 Experts opined that another of DotOrg’s 
main failings was that it treated every problem as an engineering prob-
lem instead of trying to understand what was really going wrong in the 
world.41 For instance, Google did not pursue solutions that its staff 
found too simplistic to challenge their programming skills.42 But it’s no 
surprise that was what DotOrg did, because, after all, it was run by en-
gineers. 
 Lastly, donating to charity, rather than doing it, is also often feder-
ally tax-favored, as Lloyd Mayer and Joseph Ganahl have recently 
shown.43 Firms can take an annual tax deduction for charitable contri-
butions of up to 10% of their profits.44 They receive that deduction in 
the year of the donation, regardless of when the charity actually spends 
the money.45 In contrast, if the firm spent the same amount building its 
capacity to do good works, those costs would have to be capitalized. 
The firm would get only a fraction of the deduction immediately and 
would recover the rest over time as its capacity depreciates.46 So dona-
tions are typically more valuable, taking into account the time-value of 
money.47 
B. Reasons to Be Hybrid? 
 Against this litany of problems with hybrid charity, we might stack 
the possibility of economies of scope or other efficiencies that could 
                                                                                                                      
39 Aside for readers who may have just awakened from a twenty-year sleep: Brin is one of 
Google’s two founding genius programmers. Management Team, Google Inc., http://www. 
google.com/about/company/facts/management/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). 
40 Stephanie Strom & Miguel Helft, Google Finds It Hard to Reinvent Philanthropy, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/business/30charity.html. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 20–21), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256539. 
44 I.R.C § 170(b)(2)(a) (2006). 
45 Boris I. Bittker et al., Federal Income Taxation of Individuals ¶ 25.01[3] (3d 
ed. 2002). 
46 See, e.g., I.R.C §§ 167, 199, 263, 263A. 
47 An exception would be if the firm were unprofitable on paper at the time of the do-
nations—for example, because it already had lots of other carried-over deductions from 
past years available. In that case, the unused donations would carry forward into the fu-
ture, likely making them comparable in value to the depreciation deductions the firm 
would get for producing in-house. 
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result from for-profit production of charitable goods.48 One possible 
candidate could be intellectual property, held by a for-profit firm, that 
is also very valuable in producing a charitable good. Google’s ability to 
use its search algorithms to track flu outbreaks is a potential example. 
In many cases the IP cannot simply be donated or licensed—for in-
stance, because exploiting it requires deep technical sophistication, or 
sharing it risks undermining trade secrets or otherwise reducing the 
value of the IP to the owner firm. On the other hand, it’s hard to imag-
ine a firm with more valuable IP than Google, and even that wasn’t 
enough to hold Google and Google.org together. 
 Another possible advantage often pointed to by supporters of the 
hybrid form is the superior cost effectiveness of for-profits.49 The claim 
is that nonprofit managers have little incentive to find cost savings, so 
that a for-profit firm that takes on charitable goals can learn to do more 
with less.50 I and other commentators point to some motives nonprofit 
managers might have to be efficient, such as the fact that satisfaction 
with accomplishing their mission substitutes for a share of the profits, 
that donors care about efficiency, or the possibility that boards might 
offer managers some limited forms of incentive pay.51 In the end, em-
pirical investigation will have to determine which side is right. There is 
some evidence that donors indeed care at least about administrative 
costs, and that pay-for-performance does exist in the nonprofit sector, 
but the ultimate question remains open.52 
 Hybrid advocates also mention that pure charities cannot easily 
access capital to scale up their production.53 This is another version of 
the costs of capital point: if investors are happy to finance operations 
despite the risks of opportunism by the entrepreneur, of course it 
                                                                                                                      
48 M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altru-
ism, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 571, 590–93 (2009). “Economies of scope” are savings that result 
when multiple products or tasks are delivered more efficiently as a bundle than they would 
if completed in separate firms. 
49 Katz & Page, supra note 24, at 92–93; Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-
Profit Charities, 93 Va. L. Rev. 2017, 2048–50 (2007). 
50 Malani & Posner, supra note 49, at 2048–50. 
51 Galle, supra note 17, at 1222–30; James R. Hines, Jr. et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Sta-
tus: A Charitable Assessment, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1179, 1192–1203 (2010); Leff, supra note 27, 
at 868–75; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory, 34 J. Econ. Lit. 
701, 719 (1996). 
52 Marc Jegers, Managerial Economics of Non-Profit Organizations 50–51 
(2008); see also Brian Galle & David I. Walker, Nonprofit Executive Pay as an Agency Prob-
lem: Evidence from U.S. Colleges and Universities 20–21 (Aug. 1, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187979. 
53 Katz & Page, supra note 24, at 94. 
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makes less sense to take on the costs of the nonprofit form. It is un-
clear, though, whether expansion is or should be an important non-
profit goal. The agency problems of charitable production are likely 
only to get larger as the firm expands and each individual investor’s 
control over the managers becomes more remote. 
 In any event, even charities with ready access to cash, such as uni-
versities, typically prioritize quality over quantity. The New York Phil-
harmonic is not opening NYP-branded orchestras around the country, 
exactly because the point of the endeavor is grand artistic achievement, 
not pop music.54 
 A final volley supporters of hybrid charities might offer would be 
to question whether the costs of contracting for charitable goods are 
really that high. Since Hansmann first wrote in the early 1980s, scholars 
have penned considerable new literature on the exchange of “cre-
dence” goods, or goods whose quality customers cannot easily monitor, 
ranging from legal services to organic foods.55 Though these goods 
share the property that their producers have opportunities to cheat on 
quality, few of the firms producing them are organized as nonprofits. 
 Law firms likely offer the most familiar example for readers of this 
law review. Clients generally cannot closely observe the effort or quality 
of legal services. Despite law firms’ lack of transparency, experts report 
that the firms stay in business through their reputations, trust-building 
human interactions, and professional standards with state-subsidized 
enforcement mechanisms, among other tools.56 
 Other industries rely on different “technologies” for reducing 
agency costs.57 Glaeser and Shleifer point to Silicon Valley, where co-
location of many employers offers workers assurances that employers 
cannot easily exploit the workers’ investment in industry-specific hu-
                                                                                                                      
54 See Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 10, at 108 (arguing that nonprofits prioritize qual-
ity over quantity). 
55 E.g., Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Special-
ists: The Economics of Credence Goods, 44 J. Econ. Lit. 5, 9–11 (2006); Curtis R. Taylor, The 
Economics of Breakdowns, Checkups, and Cures, 103 J. Pol. Econ. 53, 65–69 (1995); Kenneth 
H. Wathne & Jan B. Heide, Opportunism in Interfirm Relationships: Forms, Outcomes, and Solu-
tions, J. Marketing, Oct. 2000, at 36, 45–50. 
56 Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 Va. L. Rev. 
1707, 1712–19 (1998); cf. Oliver E. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance 116 
(1996) (discussing the role of reputation in reducing opportunism in repeated contract-
ing). 
57 Gary Gereffi et al., The Governance of Global Value Chains, 12 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 
78, 82–84 (2005); Taylor, supra note 55, at 65–69. In some cases the solution for reducing 
agency costs is regulation, such as malpractice liability. Dulleck & Kerschbamer, supra note 
55, at 19–20. 
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man capital.58 And, as they note, for some goods the cost of opportun-
ism is relatively trivial—for how many people does it really matter how 
the farmer grew her tomato?—so that expensive commitment devices 
such as the nonprofit form are not worthwhile.59 
 None of these examples make a clear case for hybrid entities. In 
each, it isn’t so much that the firm has figured out how to contract to 
produce credence goods, as that some outside factor diminishes the 
need for any contract. We may nonetheless have walked just up to the 
edge of a viable model for the hybrid form: innovations in governance 
techniques that might allow firms credibly to commit to something 
other than pure profit. 
III. Toward a Theory of the Hybrid Firm:  
Warming up Cold Glow? 
 An example of governance innovations that might justify the hy-
brid form is what I’ll call the thawing of the cold glow firm. The cold 
glow firm has a production process that stakeholders or consumers find 
particularly loathsome. It kills dolphins, poisons the water, sells “con-
flict diamonds,” or hires factory workers at pennies per hour. For its 
sins, it must sell products at a discount, pay out higher rates of return to 
investors, pay managers a premium, or all of the above.60 
 Firms have learned how to contract around many of these prob-
lems. As ample literature now demonstrates, firms can hire outside au-
ditors or other third-party verification systems to oversee the firm’s 
compliance with cold glow reducing goals.61 If the goals are readily de-
fined, quantified, and measured, then both contract drafting and en-
forcement can be fairly cheap. For instance, if the firm pledges to pay 
workers at least median hourly wages for their home country, or to “off-
                                                                                                                      
58 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 10, at 108. 
59 Id. 
60 Cf. Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objec-
tive Function, J. Applied Corp. Fin., Fall 2001, at 8, 16–17 (arguing that firm value may 
depend on the attitudes and emotions of customers and stakeholders towards the firm); 
Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1995, at 97, 104–05 (describing the “green 
premium” for environmentally innovative firms). 
61 E.g., Neil Gunningham et al., Shades of Green: Business, Regulation, and En-
vironment 20–40 (2003); Lesley Wexler, Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and 
Evolution of the Blood Diamond Regime, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1717, 1742–65 (2010). 
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set” its carbon emissions, there is relatively little complexity in enforc-
ing those promises.62 
 Although more abstract promises, such as pledges to be “green,” 
shade closer to the challenges of contracting for charitable goods, in-
ternational standards have developed to allow for verification of com-
mon best practices, including in the “green” context.63 Uniform tech-
nical standards allow for more “modular” production, allowing firms to 
contract with each other more readily while retaining confidence that 
they meet the standards promised to consumers.64 
 Admittedly, there is a real possibility that firms could capture their 
auditor, and so the process of establishing credibly independent verifi-
cation systems is a challenge.65 Firms may have to pay a premium to 
compensate independent auditors for the costs of maintaining a clean 
reputation. Hiring PricewaterhouseCoopers or Ernst & Young is not 
necessarily cheap. As long as this cost is less than the premium the 
counterparty would demand for its cold glow, however, the auditing 
expense is worthwhile. Some monitors may also act out of altruism or 
ideological commitment, making verification more affordable for 
smaller firms.66 
 Surprisingly, though, there are legal obstacles to the thaw. Some 
commentators suggest that corporate law sets at least a default rule bar-
ring firm managers from maximizing anything other than shareholder 
profit.67 At first glance, this seems bizarre. Remedying cold glow almost 
certainly provides returns on investment:68 though of course the in-
                                                                                                                      
 
62 Admittedly, it can be difficult to calculate carbon burdens when accounting for the 
entire chain of production and distribution for all of the firm’s inputs. 
63 See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, Green Business and the Importance of Reflexive Law: What Mi-
chael Porter Didn’t Say, 62 Admin. L. Rev. 1063, 1097–1105 (2010) (discussing the chal-
lenges of green monitoring in large firms); Green Globe Certification Standard, Green Globe, 
http://greenglobe.com/green-globe-certification-standard/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) 
(providing a certification and ranking of the businesses that comply with the best “green” 
practices). 
64 Gereffi et al., supra note 57, at 85–88, 97. 
65 See Gabriele Jahn et al., The Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a Consumer Pol-
icy Tool, 28 J. Consumer Pol’y 53, 54–57 (2005). 
66 Timothy J. Feddersen & Thomas W. Gilligan, Saints and Markets: Activists and the Sup-
ply of Credence Goods, 10 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 149, 151 (2001). 
67 For helpful critical commentary, see Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Re-
assessing the Scope of Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-
Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 409, 430–63 (2002); A.A. Berle, Jr., For 
Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365, 1367–69 (1932). 
68 Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the Business 
Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29 Cardozo L. 
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vestment might not pay off, courts generally treat managers’ investment 
decisions with great deference.69 Even if any positive returns are only 
for the managers, they still may well save the shareholders on the pre-
mium they would otherwise pay the manager to overcome her dis-
taste.70 Shareholders who don’t experience the cold glow, and prefer 
the higher cash return, can simply sell and seek out another firm as evil 
as the warming firm used to be.71 
 One case most of these commentators point to, however, the 2010 
Delaware Court of Chancery decision in eBay Domestic Holdings v. New-
mark, makes a good bit more sense.72 The case involved a suit by a mi-
nority corporate shareholder of the online listings service “Craigslist.” 
The majority stake was held by Craigslist’s founders, who apparently saw 
their newspaper-killing enterprise as a public service, and who there-
fore refused to maximize revenues.73 In this situation, the shareholder’s 
argument was much stronger. Minority stakes in firms whose control-
ling interest is held by a founder with idiosyncratic views are, shall we 
say, not typically very liquid.74 With the exit option off the table, one 
                                                                                                                      
Rev. 623, 664–65 (2007); Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a 
New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 987, 1009–10 (2009). 
69 Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733, 
763–813 (2005). 
70 Perhaps the assumption is that the manager, unless constrained by law, will be rela-
tively indifferent to the costs of remedying her distaste. In that case, the shareholders may 
lose significantly more than they would save in salary. Cf. id. at 836 (noting that managerial 
control of corporate charitable donations creates an additional way for a manager to ex-
tract rents). 
An alternative justification for allowing managers to deviate from pure profit is that 
the goal of the firm is not simply shareholder value maximization, but instead maximizing 
the joint value for all of its stakeholders. Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Law and the Team Pro-
duction Problem, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law, supra 
note 28, at 33, 47. 
71 See Elhauge, supra note 69, at 808 (arguing that capital markets will discipline man-
agers who deviate too far from shareholder preferences). Tax differences might also moti-
vate a split between shareholders and the entrepreneur. Both can substitute warm glow for 
cash or vice versa. As we know, only the cash is taxed. If shareholders pay a lower rate of 
tax, they are less interested in replacing cash with emotional satisfaction. At present, U.S. 
taxes on dividends and profits from the sale of stock are taxed at about half of the rate of 
salary. See I.R.C. §§ 1(a)–(d), 1(h)(1), 1(h)(11), 1221 (2006). 
72 16 A.3d 1, 6 (Del. Ch. 2010); see J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social En-
terprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 13 (2012) (not-
ing that defenders of social enterprise cite the eBay case “ad nauseam”). 
73 eBay, 16 A.3d at 6, 8, 26. 
74 Craigslist also adopted provisions making it more difficult for eBay to sell. Id. at 35. 
An additional complication for eBay was that its stake, while a minority, was relatively large, 
so that selling it all at once would likely have significantly depressed the price per share. See 
id. at 44. 
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can at least see why the court would be more sympathetic to the “op-
pressed” minority shareholder—a shareholder which, as a firm, likely 
did not get any direct value from the warm glow-generating business 
model. 
 Our warmth-seeking entrepreneur now faces a catch-22. If she 
keeps a majority stake in her firm, she sets up a situation in which 
shareholders might take control of the firm in court.75 On the other 
hand, of course, if she retains only a minority interest, the shareholders 
might take control in the boardroom. Either way, shareholders who 
prefer the chill—for example, because the opportunity for profit has 
increased or their tax on it has fallen—can force the entrepreneur to 
give up on her plans.76 At that stage, the entrepreneur’s exit is prob-
lematic. She can sell her stake to the other shareholders, but by as-
sumption she values cash less than the other aspects of the business. As 
a result, she may be unable to recover a good portion of the human 
capital she invested. 
 Presumably this is where the hybrid entity would step in. The en-
trepreneur offers investments in a firm that limits shareholders’ exit 
rights, or limits their ability to take control of the firm. The firm pledg-
es to pursue only relatively more easily contracted for warm glow pro-
jects, such as selling only “conflict-free” diamonds.77 Buyers take a lower 
cash return in exchange for higher warm glow. Since the shareholders’ 
protections against managerial profiteering are now more limited, they 
will likely want some guarantee that the entrepreneur won’t exit and 
leave the firm in control of a newer, cash-motivated manager. 
 Except that, as Brakman Reiser and Dean carefully show, existing 
social enterprise statutes don’t actually do those things.78 Neither inves-
                                                                                                                      
75 I don’t want to overstate the significance of these legal impediments. See Shlensky v. 
Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (rejecting the argument that protection 
for minority interests should weaken the business judgment rule). My point is only that the 
argument for protecting minority shareholders is stronger when their ability to exit is less-
ened. 
76 See Katz & Page, supra note 24, at 96–97 (noting that social enterprise firms must 
guard against opportunistic conversion to profit-seeking by some stakeholders). 
77 Cf. Hansmann, supra note 9, at 887–88 (noting that federally subsidized affordable 
housing is sometimes built by “limited dividend” firms, and this is workable because the 
government can obtain detailed financial reporting on the firm relatively easily). I actually 
believe that Hansmann is wrong about the low costs of contracting for affordable housing, 
as contracting for the government’s goals in affordable housing is more difficult than he 
suggests. See Nestor M. Davidson, Relational Contracts in the Privatization of Social Welfare: The 
Case of Housing, 24 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 263, 287–97 (2006) (describing the complex na-
ture of public-private housing policy). But the general point remains that some goods can 
easily be contracted for and monitored. 
78 Brakman Reiser & Dean, supra note 2, at 1507–13. 
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tors nor entrepreneurs face a truly limited exit because all of the exist-
ing firms can readily be converted into a standard corporation, which 
can then be sold.79 The added step may increase the costs of exit some-
what, but determined stakeholders on either side can still get out of the 
deal. 
IV. If Social Enterprise Statutes Do Not Accomplish Much, Why 
Do States Keep Passing Them? 
 My theory predicts that the world should not have produced many 
hybrid firms, at least not under the set of rules currently available for 
them. No one has yet collected any good data on how much capital is 
invested in social enterprise organizations.80 One available data point, 
however, is that a large and growing number of states have enacted stat-
utes authorizing them.81 This seems an inconvenient fact for my theory. 
 It turns out, though, that the widespread legislative popularity of 
social enterprise has little to do with its merits. Social enterprise is the 
product of a race to the bottom. Perhaps that is too strong a term. It is, 
at a minimum, a device by which state governments are seeking to di-
vert money from the federal treasury to the bank accounts of in-state 
firms. 
 Early proponents of hybrid entities were perfectly upfront about 
the tax motive. As they explained, the hope was that social enterprise 
organizations would be ruled eligible for “program-related invest-
ments” by nonprofit foundations.82 New York’s legislature even re-
ported in its official explanation of one social enterprise bill that “[t]he 
                                                                                                                      
79 Id. 
80 A preliminary tally of social enterprise organizations found that there are about 1000 
firms nationwide, of uncertain size. See Ben Schreckinger, Virtue Inc.: Can the New “Benefit 
Corporation” Charters Give Companies a Conscience?, Bos. Globe, Nov. 25, 2012, http://www. 
bostonglobe.com/ideas/2012/11/25/virtue-inc/sMNhJRcOIgZ0rqjpLTALrN/story.html; 
Here’s the Latest L3C Tally as of: September 27, 2013, interSector Partners, L3C (Sept. 27, 
2013), http://www.intersectorl3c.com/l3c_tally.html. Hybrid supporters also like to cite the 
example of the Grameen Bank, the well-known “micro-credit” organization. E.g., J. Haskell 
Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and 
Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 2–3 (2011). The 
Grameen Bank, though, is not a hybrid, and not even a corporation; it is a borrower-owned 
cooperative. Grameen Bank at a Glance, Grameen Bank, http://www.grameen-info.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=26&Itemid=175 (last visited Sept. 27, 
2013). The closest U.S. analogues to the Grameen Bank are member-owned mutual banks. 
81 Brakman Reiser & Dean, supra note 2, at 1507–13. 
82 John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C Fidu-
ciary Duties and Accountability, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 117, 122 (2010); Bruce D. Collins, Low-Profits, 
Inside Counsel ( Jan. 2, 2008), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2008/01/02/lowprofits. 
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business entity form and legislation were drafted with the goal of com-
plying with federal Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations relevant 
to Program Related Investments (PRIs) by foundations.”83 The details 
are boring for most readers, but the gist is that federal tax law obliges 
foundations to spend 5% or so of their assets each year, with a narrow 
exception for investments that themselves could be described as ac-
complishing a charitable purpose.84 
 If hybrids could qualify under the program-related investment ex-
ception, they could reap a federal tax bonanza of up to 20% or more of 
the costs of their capital. Assume that the marginal investor in the hy-
brid entity is a charitable foundation, a tax-exempt entity. Any profits 
paid by the hybrid to the foundation would be free of federal tax.85 Pre-
sumably, the hybrid could pay a correspondingly lower rate of return. 
For instance, if a tax-paying investor would demand a 10% rate of re-
turn, but pays 20% in capital gains taxes, the investor nets 8% after tax. 
All else equal, a tax-exempt investor should accept that same 8% re-
turn.86 The hybrid saves money, and the federal government collects 
less tax. Just as tax-exempt bonds are effectively a federal subsidy for 
state borrowers,87 Program Related Investments status would be a fed-
eral subsidy for hybrids.88 
 Now consider the political economy of a statute at the state level 
that authorizes hybrid entities. If a state legislator authorizes such hy-
brids, most of the federal costs of any subsidy that her state’s businesses 
receive will be paid for by taxpayers in the other forty-nine states. The 
hybrid’s investors may well be out of state, so the authorizing state 
                                                                                                                      
83 S.B. S3011-2011, 2011–2012 S. Reg. Sess., (N.Y. 2011). 
84 Culley & Horwitz, supra note 1, at 8–11. 
85 This tax benefit would only be realized assuming that these payments are not subject 
to unrelated business income tax, which they likely would not be unless the underlying 
investments were purchased on margin. Cassady V. (“Cass”) Brewer, A Novel Approach to 
Using LLCs for Quasi-Charitable Endeavors (A/K/A “Social Enterprise”), 38 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 678, 705–07 (2012). 
86 Of course, the tax-exempt investor would rather earn 10%. But presumably there is 
enough value to the foundation in escaping the 5% payout requirement that it will accept 
a lower rate. See Brewer, supra note 85, at 712–13 (outlining the advantages of Program 
Related Investments over simple grant). 
87 See John M. R. Chalmers, Default Risk Cannot Explain the Muni Puzzle: Evidence from 
Municipal Bonds That Are Secured by U.S. Treasury Obligations, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 281, 284–88 
(1998). 
88 See Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75 
Va. L. Rev. 605, 612 (1989) (noting that “any business currently subject to the corporate 
income tax would yield a higher return in the hands of an exempt nonprofit than it does 
to its current shareholders because the corporate-level tax would be eliminated by such a 
transfer”). 
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doesn’t even lose tax revenues on the investor’s profits. What’s not to 
like? And proponents are angling for other, more direct, federal incen-
tives.89 
 Imagine, too, that a neighboring state authorizes hybrids. If I am a 
North Carolina legislator, and in South Carolina, the businesses that 
employ my constituents can get a 20% federal subsidy, I can watch 
those jobs go across the border, or instead enact legislation that is virtu-
ally costless to me. Again, this is not a tough decision. 
 That’s why I describe social enterprise statutes as a race to the bot-
tom. Perhaps that’s unfair; maybe there are good corporate governance 
justifications for the existing hybrid forms I’ve overlooked.90 Given my 
alternative explanation, though, the simple fact that they have been 
popular with legislators does little to establish their efficiency. 
V. Hybrid Instruments, Not Hybrid Firms? 
 To summarize the argument so far: existing social enterprise stat-
utes give us solutions in search of a problem, while the real problem of 
exit in cold glow firms remains unsolved. This seems an opportune 
moment to return to Brakman Reiser and Dean. Their proposal, recall, 
is that firms should issue convertible debt securities, with a covenant 
permitting debt holders to assume a controlling equity interest if the 
entrepreneur attempts to sell before the end of a contractual period.91 
In this way, they argue, both investors and entrepreneurs have assur-
ances that the other party won’t transfer control to purely profit-
motivated buyers.92 
 Though “FLY Paper” has its limits, on balance it seems like a prom-
ising solution for what I’ve called the cold glow firm. First, about some 
of those limits. As the duo acknowledges, entrepreneurs can effectively 
sell the firm without actually signing on a dotted line.93 For instance, a 
founder could cause the firm to issue high-interest, subordinated debt, 
and use the proceeds to issue herself dividends. The new lender is basi-
cally an equity holder, and the founder has in essence cashed out her 
interest in the firm. More prosaically, the entrepreneur could just begin 
                                                                                                                      
89 Strom, supra note 1 (describing the “quiet push to get preferential tax treatment for 
[hybrids]”). 
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society is currently giving them. But see Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 43, at 38–52. I am skep-
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92 Id. 
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to manage the firm in a way that maximizes the cash value of her resid-
ual claim, elevating profit over other goals. 
 Brakman Reiser and Dean have an answer to these issues, but their 
answer only really works for the cold glow firm. They propose (in a 
footnote) that the equity conversion privilege could be triggered by 
events other than sale, such as if the manager extracts excessive divi-
dends.94 In other words, the parties negotiate contractual terms to pre-
vent the manager from reneging on their deal. As we’ve seen, though, 
those contracts are typically prohibitively difficult to write when the 
firm is producing some complex charitable good.95 They’re reasonably 
manageable, however, for simple, cold-glow-reducing tasks. 
 Even aside from the possibility that the manager will renege on the 
nonprofit side of the deal, debt financing introduces additional agency 
costs for the firm. Nonprofits, too, can borrow.96 Thus, if the entrepre-
neur has chosen a for-profit form, rather than a traditional nonprofit, 
she is signaling to creditors her willingness to manage the firm in a way 
that produces returns greater than a salary and pension could provide. 
Traditionally, this requires risk, which again is contrary to the prefer-
ences of most creditors.97 
 In order to limit the resulting agency costs of borrowing, firms 
usually prefer a mix of debt and equity financing.98 To get a sense of 
whether those costs are important, note that many firms continue to 
rely heavily on equity financing, despite a combined federal and state 
tax subsidy for borrowing that can range upwards of 40%.99 
 Overall, though, the FLY paper proposal helps to fill the most im-
portant hole in social enterprise statutes. Convertible debt instruments 
are likely to be fairly ineffective at governing the daily business of an 
                                                                                                                      
94 Id. at 1524 n.144. 
95 As Brakman Reiser & Dean note, contractual terms or “covenants” are common in 
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(Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/95, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1826548. 
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entity conducting both profitable and complex charitable activities. 
Then again, combining those two forms will rarely be feasible under 
any governance structure. FLY paper really takes off when issued by 
firms wanting to commit to relatively simple, discrete tasks; in that set-
ting it both provides protection against opportunistic exit and also may 
help with daily governance. 
Conclusion 
 Brakman Reiser and Dean propose a welcome addition to the ex-
isting corporate governance toolkit. Although the specific instrument 
they describe has some limitations, their idea also opens a promising 
avenue for further innovation.100 As I mentioned earlier, the absence of 
effective pay instruments for aligning managerial and stakeholder in-
terests adds greatly to the costs of contracting for the production of 
charitable goods. If future generations of FLY Paper-like instruments—
FLY spawn?—could fill that gap, they would revolutionize the charitable 
firm.101 
 In the meantime, their work adds an appropriate note of caution 
to recent social enterprise exuberance. I have tried to deepen that note 
here. So far, social enterprise looks more like a state scheme for extract-
ing federal subsidies than a solution for any corporate governance 
problem. 
 
100 For example, states could experiment with alternative formulations of default rules 
for hybrid instruments. Investors could diversify the risk of each alternative scheme by 
putting money in firms in each of the rival jurisdictions. Cf. Kelli A. Alces, Legal Diversifica-
tion, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1977 (suggesting that legal rules may supply a source of diversifi-
cation). 
101 For another set of possibilities, see Julia Y. Lee, Gaining Assurances, 2012 Wis. L. 
Rev. 1137, 1145–59 (describing the use of conditional guarantees to overcome problems of 
collective contribution to shared goods). 
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